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INTRODUCTION 
On 12 September 1980, the military assumed power in Turkey, and 
General Kenan Evren, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, became 
the new Head of State. Those unfamiliar with its progressive role as pro-
tector of Turkish secular democracy are inclined to view this military ac-
tion in a negative light. A young mother in an Ankara slum, however, 
remembered the event as the first night in which there had been no 
shooting in the streets,1 while the vast majority of Turks heaved a collec-
tive sigh of relief.2 
After quickly restoring order, General Evren's military government 
in November 1983 allowed most of its power to pass to a center-right, 
civilian government, not of its first choice, headed by Turgut Ozal. Much 
broader-based elections in November 1987 gave Ozal a renewed mandate 
to pursue a majoritarian government and a program of free-enterprise, 
economic reform, while Erdal Inonu's Social Democrats emerged as an 
attractive loyal opposition of the left. It was clear that Turkish 
democracy had successfully weathered the terrible storms of the late 
1970s and with confidence was preparing to enter the 1990s. 
To understand fully the rationale for Turkey's new democratic and 
economic initiatives of the 1980s, however, one must also appreciate the 
chaotic and demoralizing troubles of the 1970s. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to analyze this earlier period of political instability.3 
THE SETTING 
It would not be misleading to state that the Republic of Turkey 
Kemal Ataturk established in the 1920s out of the ruins of the Ottoman 
Empire was the first new, third world state of the twentieth century. 
Modern Turkey antedated the host of other non-European states that 
began to emerge after World War II by a full generation. 
In 1950 Ismet Inonu, Ataturk's successor, ended the one-party rule 
of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) by allowing Turkey's first ge-
nuinely competitive elections. They resulted in his ouster from power. 
An exaggerated majority election system, not unlike that of the 
American, winner-take-all, electoral college, gave the victorious 
Democrat Party (DP) of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes 86 percent of 
the National Assembly seats, even though it garnered only 53 percent of 
the vote. Again in 1954, the election system worked to return Menderes 
to an even greater, exaggerated majority: 93 percent of the Assembly 
seats on the basis of 57 percent of the vote. 
Thus when the Turkish military overthrew the increasingly op-
pressive Menderes regime in 1960 (but then overreacted by unfairly ex-
ecuting him a year later) it allowed the new constitution to alter the 
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electoral system to one of excessive proportional representation (PR) 
that eventually resulted in a system of rampant multipartyism that 
hindered, and eventually prevented, the emergence of any majoritarian 
government at all. 
Even though the military again, this time indirectly, intervened via a 
"coup by memorandum" in March 1971 to end a period of terrorism and 
political instability, it allowed the divisive electoral system of PR to con-
tinue when it returned power to the civilians at the end of 1973. Accord-
ingly, throughout most of the 1970s, the political balance of power in the 
Turkish Parliament was held by two small, right-wing, extremist parties 
(1) Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party (NSP), which em-
phasized Islamic, fundamentalist principles; and (2) Alparslan Turkes's 
Nationalist Action Party (NAP), which supported a protofascist pro-
gram of domestic corporatism, pan-Turkic irredentism, and a uniformed 
youth organization known as the "Grey Wolves." This system of 
stalemated, non-majoritarian, coalitional governments prevailed in the 
1970s even though three out of four of Turkey's voters identified with its 
two main, moderate parties of that era: (1) Suleyman Demirel's center-
right Justice Party (JP) and (2) Bulent Ecevit's center-left Republican 
Peoples Party (RPP). 
POLITICAL DEADLOCK AND EXTREMISM 
From 1971 to the military coup in 1980, there were ten different 
governments in Turkey. Not a single one of them represented a majority 
party in the Grand National Assembly (Turkish Parliament). Indeed only 
five of them even constituted coalitional majorities formed from the par-
ties represented in the Assembly. The others were either nonpartisan, 
technocratic cabinets indirectly installed by the military (1971-1974) or 
minority governments. 
During this period, there were two general elections in Turkey. Both 
were inconclusive since neither one of the two major parties (the RPP 
and the JP) was able to win a majority." Following the first election, 
Bulent Ecevit was able to put together a coalitional majority of his left-
of-center RPP and Necmettin Erbakan's far-right NSP. This rather 
cynical, ideological contradiction in terms managed to last long enough 
to grant what many later would deem an ill-advised general amnesty to 
thousands to accused terrorists who had been rounded up after the in-
direct military intervention of 1971.5 Then, although he successfully 
managed the intervention in Cyprus during the summer of 1974, Ecevit 
was forced to resign after failing to consolidate his position in a call for 
new elections. 
After the longest ministerial crisis in modern Turkish history, the 
first of two so-called national front governments headed by Suleyman 
Demirel's moderate, right-of-center JP in coalition with the two ex-
tremist, right-wing parties of Necmettin Erbakan (NSP) and Alparslan 
Turkes (NAP) followed. As part of the bargain, both Erbakan and 
Turkes were made deputy premiers, with the result that decision making 
became all but impossible. One close observer wrote, for example, that 
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"it was not uncommon to hear a policy pronouncement by Premier 
Demirel flatly contradicted the next day by Deputy Premier . . . Er-
bakan."6 
Demirel's first national front coalition lasted from March 1975 until 
the general election of June 1977 presented Ecevit's opposition RPP with 
parliamentary seats (213) just short of an absolute majority in the 
450-seat Assembly. Ecevit's attempt to parley this result into a successful 
minority government, however, quickly failed, and Demirel's second na-
tional front government returned to power a few weeks later. 
Disappointed over his failure, Ecevit soon was able to entice eleven 
JP deputies to his side with the promise of ministerial positions and in 
January 1978 he entered his major governmental opportunity with a 
great deal of apparent good will. This euphoria soon vanished, however, 
amid charges of a cynical bargain for power with the eleven JP deputies 
who had defected, an escalting tide of anarchy and terrorism throughout 
the country, and a sinking economy that soon saw crippling shortages of 
important consumer items, raging inflation, and rising unemployment. 
Demirel himself never forgave Ecevit for the manner in which he 
had come to power and through most of this period even refused to refer 
to Ecevit by name or as the Prime Minister, an adroit way in which to 
emphasize how the RPP government was "illegitimate."7 Near the end 
of Ecevit's term in office, Demirel blasted him as one "who seized the 
government with deceit, intrigue and cheating 20 months ago by putting 
aside the national will."8 When he had returned to power in 1980, 
Demirel on yet another occasion declared concerning Ecevit: "I have 
doubts about his sanity."9 For his part Ecevit once described Demirel as: 
"A party leader who has resorted to the most shameful methods in our 
political history, who has collaborated with criminals, the person who 
secured personal benefits from others, the leader of a party which lends 
deputies to other parties."10 
The personal invective with which Turkey's two main political party 
leaders smeared each other was more than amply matched by their 
followers. On a number of occasions "beatings, fights and foul 
language" broke out among them in Parliament." Following by-election 
setbacks in October 1979, Ecevit resigned. Demirel formed a minority 
government, but the political paralysis only grew. 
Institutional Causes 
Although it is not possible to explain this political deadlock and ex-
tremism to everyone's satisfaction, a number of points do seem relevant. 
First of all, the Turkish political culture had not yet fully been imbued 
with the concept of the loyal opposition. The 600 year old authoritarian 
heritage of the Ottoman Empire had lasted into the twentieth century, 
and although Kemal Ataturk's political promise had been one of 
democracy, his own legacy had been that of an authoritarian, one-party, 
tutelary regime. The first genuninely competitive elections in Turkey 
were only held, as noted above, in 1950. When they were held, party 
leaders such as Menderes in the 1950s and Demirel and Ecevit in the 
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1970s gave too much priority to narrow, short term party goals, while in-
hibiting the idea of legitimate opposition. 
When in power, each party staked out its own political turf. In time 
the bureaucracy grew so politicized that even judges, police, university 
rectors, and other civil servants, as well as mayors and provincial of-
ficials, became openly partisan. Thus although both Ecevit and Demirel 
began as moderate proponents of western-style democracy, the dynamics 
of the party system increasingly polarized them and precluded their 
cooperation. Moreover it seems that the mutual hostility of the party 
leaders and their resulting inability to cooperate for the good of their 
country might have been the key factor in turning Turkey's multiparty, 
coalitional government system of the 1970s on to the road of disaster.12 
The resulting mudslinging association of the RPP with communism 
and the JP with fascism began to take on more than just mere ap-
pearance. In one egregious example, a partisan of Turkes' NAP headed 
the customs and monopolies ministry under the Demirel government, 
even though the NAP was known to have close ties with drug smuggling 
activities." Turkes himself was put in charge of internal security and the 
secret services. As the 1970s progressed, Demirel's JP increasingly 
became linked with militant Sunni fundamentalism, as well as rightist 
trade, teachers, and police unions or associations. 
For its part, the RPP, given the dearth of other viable leftist parties, 
drifted further to the left, coopting extremists who had nowhere else to 
go. A number of members of the radical trade union DISK, for example, 
were also RPP deputies in the National Assembly. What had started out 
as the party of Ataturk in the 1920s and, as late as 1972, his chief lieute-
nant Inonu, had by the late 1970s become, in part, identified with Alevi 
(Shiite) leftists and Kurdish separatism. Indeed the electoral prospects of 
the far left had become so poor that by the mid-1970s Radio Moscow was 
asking Turkish Marxists to support the RPP.'4 In a post mortem analysis 
of what had happened, one of Turkey's leading journalists, Mehmet Ali 
Birand, observed: "In short, the rules of the game no longer existed in a 
free for all which dispensed with that principal tenet of democracy, 
namely, consensus. The people of Turkey looked on as passive spectators 
at this deadlock in the party political system."" 
Sociological causes 
In addition to the institutional causes analyzed above, a number of 
sociological factors also contributed to the political deadlock and ex-
tremism Turkey experienced in the late 1970s. In his seminal study, Ted 
Robert Gurr argued: 
The primary causal sequence in political violence is first 
the development of discontent, second the politicization 
ofthat discontent, and finally its actualization in violent 
action against political objects and actors. Discontent 
arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the 




Building on Gurr's general insights, Paul Magnarella has identified 
a number of sociological factors which contributed to a sense of relative 
deprivation and thus helped lead to civil violence and terrorism in 
Turkey." In the first place, the country's large population (45.4 million 
by 1980) and rapid urbanization exceeded its available economic oppor-
tunties. As Magnarella noted, relative deprivation became "markedly 
visible in the gecekondus (shanty towns) of most cities."18 The mayor of 
Istanbul declared "terrorist organizations easily recruit gunmen from 
among the jobless in the gecekondus. " " The importation of traditional 
feuds from the rural areas to the newly created urban areas stimulated 
more violence.20 
In addition there were large differences in the distribution of wealth, 
as well as goods and services among the Turkish population. High rates 
of inflation, unemployment, and underemployment compounded the 
problem. By the end of the 1970s, inflation had exceeded 100 percent.21 
Violent incidents resulted directly from this deteriorating economic situa-
tion. 
What is more, the increasing demand for, but limited supply of, 
higher education opportunities created additional difficulties. Serif Mar-
din explained: 
In 1977, 360,000 students competed in the entrance ex-
amination to universities for 60,000 places. This leaves 
300,000 candidates suspended in mid-stream, with no 
means of reintegrating them into the employment struc-
ture except as disgruntled minor employees with salaries 
that constitute a pittance by any standards.22 
Even those who were admitted often found themselves alienated by the 
overcrowded classrooms and antiquated memorization methods. 
Moreover, many who finally did receive a diploma were unable to find 
employment. 
The law on autonomy, which allowed Turkish universities a great 
deal of immunity from regular police regulation, permitted campuses in 
the 1970s to become small arsenals and hotbeds of terrorism. Writing in 
the late 1970s, Serif Mardin noted how old cultural norms reinforced 
these new legal opportunities: 
Student violence, by and large, is directed against other 
students. The pattern of attack, retaliation, revenge and 
counter-offensive in which groups are involved is 
reminiscent of the mechanism of the blood feud in its 
regularity, symmetry and inevitability.23 
Unwittingly the Turkish system of higher education was also contribut-
ing to the growth of the country's political deadlock and extremism. 
Further deadlock 
This political deadlock and extremism had become so entrenched 
that when the Turkish military—which saw itself as the ultimate guar-
dian of Turkish democracy24—delivered an "opinion" (actually a letter 
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of warning) on 27 December 1979 to "those political parties which could 
not introduce solutions to the political, economic and social 
problems . . . that have grown to dimensions threatening the integrity of 
the country,"25 it fell upon deaf, paralyzed institutions. Demirel, for ex-
ample, argued that it could not be meant for his government because it 
had only been in power for thirty days. Ecevit, on the other hand, deter-
mined that since he was now out of office, the warning was not intended 
for him. "It was as if this opinion [of the military] was directed at a 
vacuum,"26 concluded the Turkish military after it finally assumed 
power nine months later. 
The deadlock continued. When President Fahri Koruturk's term 
ended on 6 April 1980, the paralyzed political parties could not even per-
form their constitutional duty to elect a new chief of state. As political 
violence and anarchy (see below) began to take from twenty to thirty 
lives a day, the Turkish Parliament remained hopelessly deadlocked; 
more than 100 ballots were taken over a six month period. Prime 
Minister Demiel almost seemed to welcome the situation since it enabled 
a member of his own JP, as presiding officer of the Senate, to act as in-
terim president. 
After it toppled this deadlocked regime, the Turkish military 
declared: "Everyone observed that the political parties had driven into 
an impasse the election of the highest authority of the State due to 
calculations of their political interests . . . . The situation was a new ex-
ample clearly demonstrating the impasse of the Turkish Parliament."27 
Elsewhere the new military government later declared: 
The political parties, an indispensable element of any 
democratic society, could not reach a concensus on even 
the most important issues of state. Their partisan at-
titudes permeated even the smallest organs in the struc-
ture of society. The state institutions, universities, 
schools (of all levels), security establishments, labour 
organisations, local administrations, in short, every in-
stitution in the country fell under the influence of the 
political rivalry. These institutions could not function 
effectively in this atmosphere, and everything got 
worse.28 
Even after this deadlocked regime had been toppled and Demirel 
and Ecevit taken into preventive detention, the two and their respective 
parties continued their sterile wrangling over the military's proposals for 
a new, 'above politics' cabinet. High-ranking officials offered positions 
by the military first rang up Demirel or Ecevit for advice and approval.2' 
"Jilted [sic] by what they saw as the incorrigible mendacity, 
prevarication and short-sightedness of the political establishment,"30 the 
military leaders finally decided to "cut the Gordian knot" by abolishing 
all the political parties and banning their leaders from any renewed 
political activity for a period of ten years. Given the impasse they had led 
their country into, it is difficult to muster much sympathy for these 
leaders of the old order. 
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One more incident must be mentioned before ending this section. 
On 6 September 1980 Erbakan staged a massive rally of his NSP 
followers in the traditionally conservative and religious city of Konya to 
protest against the Israeli decision to make Jerusalem their capital. 
Although the military had already decided irrevocably upon interven-
tion, this incident undoubtedly reaffirmed its intention. The description 
of this event later given by General Evren's new government illustrates 
graphically the challenge that was being issued to Turkey's secular 
democracy. 
A big green flag (which symbolizes Islamic law) with 
Arabic writing was being paraded in front of the 
crowd . . . . After . . . it was announced that the Na-
tional Anthem was going to be sung . . . it was observ-
ed that a group of the mob sat down on the ground and 
yelled . . . "we won't sing this march."31 
ANARCHY AND TERRORISM 
The political deadlock and extremism detailed above inevitably slid 
into and reinforced outright anarchy and terrorism. Although it is dif-
ficult fully to appreciate just how serious this violence became, some in-
dication is offered by the satistical analysis later released by General 
Evren's new government.32 The figures that follow graphically illustrate 
the tremendous buildup of anarchy and terrorism before the military in-
tervention on 12 September 1980 and its speedy demise afterwards. 
Statistical analysis 
There was a total of 9,795 incidents of clashes and armed attacks 
during the overall period. Of these, 91% occurred before 12 September, 
while only 9% took place afterwards. At the same time a total of 6,732 
incidents of arson and throwing of explosives took place. Of this figure, 
94.5% occurred before the military intervention and only 5.5% after. 
Out of a total of 4,388 incidents of robbery and unlawful acquisition 
which occurred during the overall period, 68% took place during the first 
period and 32% during the second. Furthermore a total of 2,591 student 
incidents took place at the educational institutions during the time frame 
examined. Of these, 97.7% took place before 12 September, while only 
2.3% occurred afterwards.35 
During these times, a total of 4,040 people lost their lives as a result 
of violence, a figure which includes the members of the security forces 
who were killed but excludes those from the ranks of the terrorists.34 Of 
this total, 92% occurred before the military intervention and only 8% 
after. In all, 11,160 people were wounded as a result of terrorist in-
cidents, 93.3% before and only 6.7% after 12 September. Concurrently, 
martial law forces confiscated a total of 804,197 weapons during the 
overall period. Only 4% of these were seized before the military 
takeover, while 96% were taken after. 
Statistical data concerning the political persuasions of the captured 
terrorists are also useful. In the year following the 12 September 
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intervention, a total of 43,140 persons including 21,864 leftists, 5,953 
rightists, 2,034 (Kurdish) separatists,35 and 13,289 people whose political 
orientations have not been established were arrested.36 The arrested leftists 
were responsible for the murder of 729 people and the wounding of 914. 
The detained rightists had killed 434, while wounding 508. The figures for 
the apprehended separatists were 224 and 251 respectively. 
Most of the captured terrorists were males. The monthly income of 
89% of them was below the TL10.000 national average of that time and 
79% of them were bachelors. In terms of educational levels, the largest 
group of terrorists (36%) had a secondary school education. Those with 
only an elementary one constituted 28%, while illiterates accounted for 
22%. University graduates (14%) were the smallest group. 
The breakdown by profession of the captured terrorists listed: (1) 
students 23%; (2) unemployed 20%; (3) self-employed 15%; (4) workers 
14%; (5) civil servants 10%; (6) teachers 7%; and (7) housewives 1%. In 
terms of age, the group between 16 and 25 constituted the largest at 57% 
of all the captured terrorists, those between 25 and 35—28%, and 
45—11%, and over 45—4%. 
Summing up these statistics, General Evren's new government 
declared: "A careful study of these figures and the causes of the in-
cidents of anarchy and terrorism will clearly show how our youth have 
been victimized by anarchy and terrorism, the place of workers, teachers, 
and some civil servants in violence, and the effects of unemployment."37 
Evren's government also blamed certain "foreign states which for years 
had exploited every opportunity to realize their designs against this coun-
try" for this deadly spate of anarchy and terrorism.38 Indeed evidence 
emerged after 12 September to indicate that the Soviet Union and 
Bulgaria had supplied weapons to the various Turkish terrorist factions, 
while Syria and the PLO had provided training facilities.3' The purpose 
of this foreign intervention was to destablize a crucial link in the NATO 
alliance. 
On the other hand, Mehmet Ali Birand, a respected Turkish jour-
nalist who recently wrote a best-seller about the 1980 military coup in 
Turkey, admitted that with few exceptions "our knowledge today [1987] 
about the 'wave of terror' of the late 1970s is still as restricted to guess-
work and circumstantial evidence as it was at the time."40 Although men-
tioning the foreign arms shipments into Turkey, Birand pointed out that 
"the authorities . . . still remained in doubt as to who paid for those and 
the networks behind these death merchants."41 Continuing, he suggested 
that such sociological factors as Turkey's rapid urbanization and the 
resulting decline of traditional rural life styles, as well as the 
"authoritarian personality" in the Turkish culture which made possible 
"extremist and messianic ideological mobilization,"42 also played an im-
portant role. 
Specific incidents 
Although the statistics cited above paint an overall picture of the 
situation, an analysis of some of the specific incidents can give a 
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poignancy to these events that otherwise would be lacking. After it came 
to power General Evren's government published a lengthy analysis to ex-
plain "what sort of conditions prevailed in the country to prompt them 
[the military] to assume the running of the state."43 
One of the first spectacular incidents of anarchy and terrorism oc-
curred on May Day in 1977 when some thirty-seven people were killed at 
a huge rally organized by DISK in Taksim Square, Istanbul. Although 
not adequately explained to this day, shots from the surrounding roof-
tops apparently were fired into the crowd of 200,000 which then panick-
ed and stampeded most of the victims to death. 
The report of an incident at Umraniye, Istanbul early in 1978 il-
lustrated how vicious things were becoming. 
The bodies of five workers, apparently murdered after 
torture, were found in this district . . . . The bodies of 
the victims . . . were so mutilated as to be almost 
unidentifiable. Their heads were crushed, eyes gouged 
out, genitals cut away. The barbarism surpassed belief. 
These criminals . . . were later to admit cold-bloodedly 
before the Turkish courts of justice, that they had com-
mitted this atrocity as execution of the verdict of their 
so-called "People's Court."44 
Shocking as these two events were, both paled before the near civil 
war of sectarian killing that broke out in the southeastern city of 
Kahramanmaras in late December 1978. General Evren's government 
later described what had happened in this manner: 
The country experienced one of its most terrible ex-
amples of mass terrorism when a massacre occurred at 
Kahramanmaras . . . . Security forces prove to be in-
capble in preventing the incidents. Gendarmery troops 
from Gaziantep and airborne troops from Kayseri are 
deployed . . . . Bloodshed goes on . . . . The Council 
of Ministers proclaims martial law in 13 
provinces . . . . A consensus was barely reached. The 
balance sheet in . . . Kahramanmaras included 109 
dead, 176 seriously wounded and 500 houses and shops 
destroyed.45 
Five weeks later the single murder of Abdi Ipekci (the distinguished 
editor of Milliyet, one of Turkey's leading newspaper) was eventually to 
make Turkish terrorism even more notorious in the eyes of international 
opinion. This was because Ipekci's assassin was Mehmet Ali Agca. Ap-
prehended several months later, Agca, an apparent member of Turkes's 
Grey Wolves, escaped from prison with inside help. On 13 May 1981, 
under circumstances still not entirely clear,46 Agca attempted unsuc-
cessfully to assassinate Pope John Paul II in St. Peter's Square in Rome. 
Although these spectacular terrorist attacks made the headlines, 
Turkey also was increasingly being submitted to a daily drumbeat of 
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more mundane anarchical and terrorist incidents that "were escalating so 
rapidly that it became impossible to follow who was murdered or wound-
ed and which banks were robbed or which offices were bombed."47 
The intensity of this anarchy and terrorism continued to escalate in 
1980. In January of that year armed clashes between several thousand 
troops and militant DISK workers at the Taris textile plant in Izmir 
rapidly spread to various other parts of Turkey's third largest city. "Iz-
mir turned into a powder keg. Students also joined the clashes . . . . The 
workers placed bomb placards in the way of the police and opened fire 
on fire fighting teams,"48 stated General Evren's government. 
The Tarsus incidents in southeastern Turkey occurred in April and 
resulted in the death of nine and the wounding of twenty. They were the 
result of a traffic fatality that leftist elements used to agitate the people 
into a confrontation with the security forces. "Everything turned into 
hell at once," the military later explained.4' 
In June right wing extremists assassinated the District Chairman of 
the RPP in Nevsehir, a small city some 200 kilometers southeast of 
Ankara. On 18 June, the RPP funeral delegation led by Ecevit travelled 
to that central Anatolian city, only to be met by a hail of stones and then 
bullets that wounded five. Abandoning the coffin in the middle of a nar-
row street, the members of the funeral procession ran for their lives. 
Unable to contact the Prime Minister (Demirel) for help, Ecevit finally 
was able to get a call through to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces 
(Evren). "General Evren, I can't reach the Prime Minister so I am calling 
you. My deputies and I have come under gunfire. Our lives are in danger. 
We are unable to bury our dead. I seek your help and support."50 
The military responded quickly and order was restored. The 
supreme irony of the Nevsehir incident,, however, was that Ecevit, who as 
a leftist opposed extraordinary powers for the military, had to call upon 
it to protect himself and his supporters. 
By 1980, 31 of Turkey's 67 provinces reportedly contained so-called 
"liberated zones," areas under the exclusive authority of one ideological 
faction or another, and closed off to the state's security forces. One of 
the most publicized cases occurred in the remote Black Sea coastal town 
of Fatsa.51 Here radical leftists known as Dev Yol (Revolutionary Way) 
had set up an alternative regime complete with its own municipal ser-
vices, "People's Court," and mayor. Only in July 1980 did the govern-
ment move against Fatsa, and, as the military later explained, captured 
"some 300 militants of illegal organizations including the Mayor of the 
town . . . . An operation carried [out] after 12 September, made 
clear . . . how this town was turned into [an] experimental site of a 
regime which was prohibited by our Constitution."52 
On Friday, 4 July a bomb exploded near a mosque in Corum, a city 
some 200 kilometers east of Ankara, and the area was strafed with 
bullets. Rumors soon spread that "communists were burning and 
destroying mosques."53 Sectarian fighting between Sunni and Alevis 
broke out "and more than 100 houses and shops were burnt and 
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destroyed on the first day. Nobody could enter the scenes of fire, not 
even the security forces . . . . Jet fighters carried out deterrent flights 
over the town."54 "A correspondent of the national daily newspaper 
Milliyet dispatched to Corum ahead of the armoured brigade barely 
escaped with his life when he was bundled back into his car and sent 
packing by right-wing paramilitaries manning road blocks controlling 
approaches to the city."5' By the time order was finally restored, at least 
23 people had been killed. 
Less than three weeks later, left-wing terrorists gunned down former 
(1971-1972) Prime Minister Nihat Erim in Istanbul. While his funeral 
was taking place, Kemal Turkler, the former President of DISK, was 
assassinated by right-wing terrorists. Bankrupt and paralyzed, the old 
regime was approaching its inglorious and unlamented end. On 12 
September the military stepped in. 
POSTSCRIPT 
It is difficult not to admire the military for ending the political 
deadlock and extremism, as well as the terrible anarchy and terrorism 
that was threatening the very existence of the Turkish state in the late 
1970s. Too many critics of the Evren government fail to appreciate the 
severity of the situation which existed. Nobody pretends that the military 
used kid gloves. Few wanted it to. The times called for extraordinary 
means, and the military proved up to the task. Indeed, given the trying 
circumstances, one might argue that Evren's government demonstrated 
relative moderation toward those who had come so close to destroying 
the state. It is doubtful that a house in such disorder could have been set 
in order any more lightly than was done after 1980. 
Further, there can be no doubt that some of the charges of human 
rights violations and torture levelled against the regime were politically 
motivated by the very ones who had tried, but failed, to bring the 
Turkish state down. "Some of the traitors who fled abroad because of 
arrests at home following September 12, continued their activities against 
Turkey in foreign countries and attempted to disseminate through cer-
tain international organizations allegations that their supporters in 
Turkey are being subjected to torture and ill treatment."56 
Nevertheless the continuing violation of human rights in Turkey to-
day is too well documented to dismiss out of hand.57 Indeed Evren's 
government has implicitly admitted such abuses. "These elements and 
other institutions supporting them [those critical of the Evren regime] 
have never talked about the massacres and torture implemented by the 
inhuman murderers responsible for thousands of killings and the crea-
tion of a climate of fear and intimidation over the Turkish people before 
September 12. "5S Similarly a well placed Turkish source more recently 
declared: "That torture, even if not systematic in the sense of being 
government-controlled, was so wide-spread and a common practice, that 
only those with political affiliations care about it. The common thief, 
burglar and what Turks call the 'simple criminal' would just accept it as a 
way of life."59 
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Teoman Evren, the President of the Union of Turkish Bar Associa-
tions, declared in June 1987: 
Not enough action has been taken on torture. Statesmen 
have not taken definitive actions to end torture, and 
courts have not followed up torture allegations with suf-
ficient care. The attitude of officials who do not pursue 
torturers encourages more torture. Statesmen make 
statements that give heart to torturers, for example, say-
ing that torture takes place all over the world—in 
Sweden, in the United States.60 
Both Ecevit and Demirel, who regained their political rights through a 
special referendum in September 1987, have also spoken out on the mat-
ter. Ecevit declared that "torture and arbitrary killings are 
continuing,"61 while Demirel added "that 175 or 180 people have died 
from torture, and that torture is the policy of the current government."62 
In allowing this situation to continue past the time called for by the 
extraordinary events of the late 1970s, the Evren-Ozal government is now 
besmirching the good name of those who saved Turkey from collapse in 
1980 and set it so successfully upon the road to subsequent democratic 
and economic renewal. It is encouraging, therefore, that the 1987 
Helsinki Watch report on the situation in Turkey concluded: 
The human rights situation in Turkey remains in a state 
of flux, but there are still good reasons for optimism. A 
number of important steps have already been taken by 
the government to improve the situation and a verbal 
commitment to human rights and democracy has been 
publicly made by most of the major political forces in 
the country . . . . This provides a basis for our con-
tinued hope that Turkey will ultimately achieve a 
government that respects human rights in its actions as 
well as in its words and provides guarantees for their 
protection.63 
It is to be hoped that this optimism is not misplaced. 
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